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We investigate the conditions from which inferences can be drawn regarding sustainability of fiscal 
stance on the one hand, and a long-run relationship between inflation and budget deficits on the other. 
These issues have assumed even greater importance in the aftermath of the collapse of the 1999 
stabilization program in February 2001 that was designed to achieve sustainability in debt dynamics 
and produce a permanent reduction in inflation rates. The first set of findings indicates nonstationarity 
in the discounted debt to GNP ratio process during 1970-2000, implying an unsustainable fiscal 
outlook.  The inference does not imply insolvency, but points to the necessity of a policy change 
towards fiscal austerity. The second set of findings pertaining to the long-run relationship between the 
inflation rate, budget deficit, and real output growth suggests two important results. The first of these 
is that the consolidated budget deficit does not have a long-run component unlike the inflation rate, 
suggesting that changes in the consolidated budget deficit have no permanent effect on the inflation 
rate. On the other hand, the PSBR does have a long-run component and is cointegrated with the 
inflation rate, which implies that the PSBR is a better indicator of fiscal deficits in comparison to the 
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Turkey had embarked yet another disinflation and structural reform program in December 
1999 that failed drastically after the two crises in November 2000 and February 2001. Prior to 
the crises, the government had been sending very dim fiscal signals, and even counter-
effective ones in the form of lack of commitment for durable fiscal measures and increased 
transparency in public accounts. These weak signals had led to the contention by the domestic 
and foreign holders of the government debt that the government would not be able to reduce 
real interest rates and hence the interest burden, and the fiscal credibility stood at an all time 
low since the initiation of the program in December 1999. Lackadaisical fiscal performance 
had prevailed for an extended time period, and the tolerance limits of the markets were being 
tested presumably without being too aware of it. The program has been given another push by 
substantial foreign financial backing and the IMF Executive Board has initiated a second 
phase after the approval of the Letter of Intent in May 2001.  
The primary focus of the 1999 stabilization program was the rehabilitation of fiscal 
balances through structural reforms, a natural by product of which would have been 
disinflation. Despite substantial progress on both fronts, the program nevertheless failed due 
mainly to inadequate fiscal adjustment through structural reforms, which exacerbated the 
sustainability outlook in the medium term. What are the features of the predicament the 
Turkish economy is in, after the collapse of the exchange rate based stabilization program, 
and how prevalent are they expected to be in the foreseeable future? The inflation threat 
seems to be alive and doing well, and the debt/GDP ratio has taken a substantial turn for the 
worse, undermining the debt dynamics seriously. Tough choices and unforgiving tradeoffs, it 
seems, will be the high on the agenda more than ever.  
During the past two decades, Turkish inflation experience has been a particularly 
interesting one for its high and chronic nature and for the absence of any hyperinflationary 
episodes. It jumped to different plateaus and displayed varying degrees of persistence at these 
plateaus, but hyperinflation never materialized.
1 The consensus view has been that the main 
culprit behind the inflationary process is fiscal imbalances, but the latest understanding on the 
nature of inflation is that it is a highly inertial process.
2 Alper and Uçer (1998) demonstrate 
the nominal dimension of the inflationary process in Turkey and assert the need for a 
sufficiently credible and elegantly designed disinflation program that could dislodge the 
inertial component substantially. Using the 1948-1985 annual data Metin (1998) finds a 
significant link from higher deficits to higher inflation, while Akçay et al. (1996) find a 
weakened link in the post 1985
3 period from budget deficit and money growth to inflation in 
the case of Turkey. 
The empirical link from budget deficits to monetary expansion and then to inflation is 
usually weak, leading some people to hastily jump to the conclusion that deficits may indeed 
be less crucial than one may think in determining the course of inflation. These very same 
advocates of “inflationary processes detached from budget deficits” point to declining or 
intact seigniorage revenues, i.e., lack of monetization in the face of increasing budget deficits, 
and provide that as further empirical support for their position. Yet, even when a central bank 
does not monetize the deficit, adjustments in the private sector to higher deficit policies may 
very well lead to inflation. The transmission can be through the real and/or financial sectors or 
 
1 For detailed analyses of the inflationary process in Turkey, see Alper and Ucer (1998) and Ertuðrul and 
Selçuk (2001). 
2 The inertial nature of inflation in Turkey had been emphasized for the first time by monetary authorities in the 
monetary program announced at the time of signing of the 17
th stand-by arrangement with the IMF in 
December 1999.  Akcay et al. (1996) demonstrated the increasingly inertial nature of the inflationary process 
in the post-1985 bond-financing era.  
3 Primary market auctions of government securities started in June 1985. thorough the “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic”.
4 The real sector will suffer the consequences 
of higher deficit policies financed by the issuing of bonds in the form of crowded out 
investment in plant and equipment, culminating in reduced output growth. With money 
supply intact and output falling, prices will start to increase. In the financial sector, on the 
other hand, innovations in the form of new financial instruments are encouraged through high 
interest rates, and repos are typical examples of such innovations in chronic and high inflation 
countries. People are thus able to hold interest-bearing assets that are almost as liquid as 
money, and monetization is effectively done by the private financial sector instead of the 
government. The final transmission mechanism leading to higher inflation now is based on 
expectations of higher future inflation. The impact of reduced seigniorage and increased 
borrowing increases the debt, implying that either the deficit will have to increase or that 
government will have to print money to keep the deficit/GDP ratio intact. If future deficits are 
to be avoided at some stage to ensure sustainability of the debt/GDP ratio, then monetization 
will have to be resorted to, and hence the expectation of higher future inflation. Thus the link 
between budget deficits and inflation is not very straightforward, and high inflation 
equilibrium may very well be one of the equilibria corresponding to the same fundamentals. A 
proper analysis of the budget deficit-money growth- inflation link will have crucial policy 
implications. If inflation is found to be a “nominal” problem with a strong inertial component, 
then the costs of disinflation are presumably being overemphasized. Hence our motivation to 
explore some basic issues regarding the inflationary process in Turkey, which will also 
contribute to the debate pertaining to the appropriateness of the chosen disinflation strategy at 
the end of 1999. An overwhelmingly nominal nature for inflation would legitimize the choice 
of a nominal anchor, inevitably the exchange rate in the case of Turkey. It goes without 
saying that the very same nature of inflation would make credibility an indispensable 
ingredient of any disinflation program.  
Macroeconomic effects of budget deficits, their financing, and the ensuing debt dynamics 
have enjoyed substantial attention in macro theory recently, particularly in the light of 
different growth performances displayed by developing countries (See Easterly, 2001). The 
link from sound fiscal policies to macroeconomic stability and ultimately to sustainable 
growth is now fully recognized and a group of countries, most of which constitute the 
emerging markets segment of the world economy, spend all their efforts to put themselves on 
the sustainable growth path. The size of the budget deficit a country registers and the means 
of financing it determine the debt dynamics and the fiscal constraints the country will be 
subject to in the medium to long term.  
Unstable debt dynamics have dire implications for budgetary policy. When the public 
perceives the unsustainability of fiscal policy, it will relinquish its holdings of government 
debt and necessitate a change in policy. The intention of the governments should be to pre-
empt this and conduct a change of policy before the holders of debt impose the change on 
them. The Turkish Government has been taking fairly drastic measures in the first half of 
2001 following the devaluation in February 2001, but how and if these will lead to a change 
in public’s expectations, still remains as a question. An inference of unsustainability would 
shift the market sentiment drastically towards a pessimistic outlook, and throw the economy 
into the bad equilibrium it tried to avoid in the first place.  
Intuitively, sustainability of a given fiscal policy will be determined by projections of the 
future path of debt/GNP ratio. It is ultimately the willingness and appetite of the creditors that 
will determine the sustainability of the ratio.  
Formal tests of sustainability are based on the accounting and present value constraint 
(PVC) approaches.
5 In the accounting approach, sustainability of a primary deficit (or surplus) 
 
4 For the first two mechanisms, see Miller (1983) and Sargent and Wallace (1981) for the third. 
5 For an excellent and exhaustive survey on this issue, see Cuddington (1996). is measured by its capability to generate a constant debt/GDP ratio given a growth target and 
unchanging real interest rate. Liabilities are allowed to grow at the output growth rate, leaving 
debt/GDP growth constant, and the role of lenders in defining the sustainability of fiscal 
policy is questionable. The PVC approach is based on the “no Ponzi game” (NPG) condition, 
effectively saying that the presented discounted value of expected future surpluses be equal to 
the outstanding debt stock at any instance for sustainability of the debt/GDP ratio. Anand and 
Wijnbergern (1989) conduct an analysis pertaining to the sustainability of fiscal deficits in 
Turkey whereby they seek levels of “financeable deficit” that is compatible with sustainable 
internal and external borrowing. Simultaneous sustainability of current account deficits and 
budget deficits has also been investigated under an extension of the PVC approach in Ahmed 
and Rogers (1995).  
Testing of the NPG or the transversality condition has been mostly applied to the US and 
G-7 data for reasons of demanding data requirements (See for example, Flavin and Hamilton, 
1986; Trehan and Walsh, 1991; Ahmed and Rogers, 1995; and Uctum and Wickens, 2000). 
Tests involve checking for stationarity in series such as fiscal deficit and debt, discounted 
debt, real deficit inclusive of real interest payments, or cointegration between government 
revenue and spending, between real government revenue, expenditure, and real interest 
payments, etc. Unit root and cointegration techniques require fairly long time series over a 
constant fiscal regime and such requirements can naturally be putting developing countries in 
a handicapped position for long-term analysis purposes. There are possible compromises as 
indicated in Cuddington (1996) such as utilizing fiscal rules to be implemented in the 
foreseeable future, and then using these to obtain the implied time path for the internal and 
external debt with current debt levels as the initial conditions. We are aware of these and other 
data limitations, but have chosen to explore the sustainability issue with the actual data we 
have been able put together after making certain corrections and transformations.  
In this paper we investigate empirically the sustainability of fiscal policies in Turkey as 
well as the existence of a stable long-run relationship between budget deficits and inflation 
using annual data for the 1970-2000 period.  
The first set of findings indicates nonstationarity in the discounted debt to GNP ratio 
process during 1970-2000, implying an unsustainable fiscal outlook.  The inference does 
imply insolvency, but points to the necessity of a policy change towards fiscal austerity. The 
second set of findings pertaining to the long-run relationship between the inflation rate, 
budget deficit, and real output growth suggests two important results. The first of these is that 
unlike the inflation rate, the consolidated budget deficit does not have a long-run component, 
suggesting that changes in the consolidated budget deficit have no permanent effect on the 
inflation rate. On the other hand, the PSBR does have a long-run component and is 
cointegrated with the inflation rate, which implies that the PSBR is a better indicator of fiscal 
deficits in comparison to the consolidated budget deficit. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the analytical framework by 
focusing on the economics of government budget constraint. We briefly derive the condition 
for checking the sustainability of fiscal policy for a high nominal growth country like Turkey. 
We also present the theoretical long-run relationship between inflation and scaled budget 
deficit to be used for empirical analysis. Section 3 describes data and presents the empirical 
results. Section 4 concludes. 2. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This section presents the framework that will be used in the empirical analyses. We focus 
on two important issues: sustainability of Turkish fiscal policy and the characterization of the 
long-run relation among budget deficit, money and inflation in Turkey.  
From national income identities, the simple definition of budget deficit of the consolidated 
public sector equals the sum of private sector savings less private sector investment 
expenditure, and current account deficit. The identity merely states the possibility of crowding 
out of private investment in the face of a budget deficit increase in an open economy; a rise in 
the budget deficit leads to a reduction in private investment for given private savings and 
current account deficit.
6 The impact of budget deficits on private investment is unequivocal, 
mostly with dire repercussions on output growth and further worsening of fiscal balances 
through reduced tax revenues. 
The financing of the deficit can be done through money printing, internal and/or external 
borrowing and use of central bank’s foreign reserves. External borrowing and use of reserves 
combined would correspond to the link between budget and current account deficits, and 
money printing and use of central bank’s reserves combined would emphasize credit 
extension by central bank. Each financing mechanism would entail different macroeconomic 
repercussions; money printing would be linked to inflation, use of reserves with exchange rate 
movements and possible balance of payments crises, foreign borrowing with external debt 
crises, and internal borrowing with higher interest burden and potentially explosive debt 
dynamics. 
2.1 Sustainability of Fiscal Policy for a High Nominal Growth Economy 
We assume that all public debt consists of one period debt and the primary government 
budget deficit can be financed in two different forms: money printing and bond financing 
(internal and external).  The nominal one-period intertemporal government budget deficit can 
be written as: 
t t t t t t B M B i T G D + D = + - -1  (1) 
where  t G  is government expenditure,  t T  is tax revenue,  t B  is the total stock of domestic and 
foreign debt
7 at the end of period t,  t M  is reserve money, and,  t i  is the nominal interest rate 
on government debt.  Dividing each term in the equation by the nominal output, Y , and 





























- - + - = + -  (2) 
 
6 The rise in the budget deficit could alternatively lead to a deterioration in the current account with private 
investment staying intact, but the link is a bit ambiguous in this case as the monetary policy accompanying 
the fiscal expansion becomes crucial. If monetary policy is contractionary, that increases the interest rate and 
pushes up the exchange rate as well, leading to a depreciation of the currency. That in turn improves the 
current account balance, rather than worsening it along with the higher budget deficit. 
7 All the variables entering the government budget constraint are expressed in TL.  For brevity, it is assumed 
that lenders are indifferent between borrowing TL denominated government securities and Turkish 
Eurobonds.  where the lower-case variables (excluding  t i ) denote the ratio of corresponding upper-case 
variables to nominal output.  Using the growth rate of the nominal output,  t Y g , , and 
rearranging the right hand side, we obtain: 
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Collecting  1 - t b  on the left hand side, 
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r  (5) 
where  ( ) ( ) t Y t Y t t g g i , , 1+ - = r  and stands for the nominal interest rate adjusted for the 
nominal output growth. Alternatively, considering the “exact” relationship between the 
growth rate of nominal output,  t Y g , , of real output,  t Q g , , and inflation rate
8,  t p , 
( )( ) ( ) t Y t t Q g g , , 1 1 1 + = + + p , one can obtain  ( ) ( )( ) t t Q t Q t t Q t t t g g g i p p p r + + - - - = 1 1 , , ,  
which can be interpreted as the ex-post real interest rate adjusted for real output growth.  
  Equation (5) can be expressed more compactly as 
t t t t b b d D = + - r 1  (6) 
where  ( ) ( ) t y t y t t t t t g g m m t g d . . 1 1+ - D - - = -  and denotes the primary deficit less the 
reserve money change and seigniorage, each term scaled by nominal output. Solving for  1 - t b , 
equation (6) can be written in discounted terms as 
( )( ) t t
t
t d b b -
+
= - r 1
1
1 . (7) 
Uçtum and Wickens (2000) show for the general case, where  t r  is stochastic and  t d  is 
allowed to be either strongly or weakly exogenous, that a necessary and a sufficient condition 
for sustainability is that the discounted nominal debt-nominal output ratio
9 be stationary. 
 
8 For countries with low inflation and nominal output growth rates, the real output, nominal output 
approximation given by  t t Y t Q g g p - = , , may be valid, however, for a high-inflation country like Turkey, one 
has to use the exact relationship.  
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t
k t t b X r  2.2 The Long-Run Relation Between Budget Deficits, Money Growth and 
Inflation 
The nominal one-period intertemporal government budget constraint to be used in this 
section is a slightly modified version of the one used in the sustainability section where the 
budget deficit, 
*
t D  now is inclusive of interest payments: 
t t t B M D D + D =
*  (8) 
where  t B  and  t M  are as defined in the sustainability section. Our purpose is to express 
inflation as a function of the terms in the budget constraint for a long-run estimable 
relationship. 
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and noting that in a steady-state growing economy,  
























p  (10) 
where the nominal output growth is expressed in terms of the real output growth and the 
inflation rate. Substituting equation (10) into (9) and solving for the inflation rate, we obtain 
the following long-run relation between inflation, scaled budget deficit and real output 
growth. 
( )( ) ( ) t Q
t Q















p  (11)  
Equation (11) is the estimable equation for analyzing the long-run relationship between 
inflation rate, scaled deficit and real output growth. 
3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.1 Data 
Finding reliable and consistent data on public sector fiscal accounts, even for annual 
frequency, proved to be a challenging task.  This is merely a reflection of the traditional lack 
of accountability and transparency in the fiscal accounts.
10 Fiscal accounts data from various 
sources like the State Institute of Statistics, the Treasury, the Ministry of Finance, and the 
State Planning Organization, more often than not, turned out to be inconsistent. Moreover, 
consolidated budget balance, which includes the balances of general government as well as 
the annexed institutions, came out to be less than 50% of the public sector borrowing 
 
10 The very issue has been vociferously phrased in the Turkish Audit Court’s “Year 2000 Fiscal Report”. requirement. Since consolidated budget balance data is the only available high frequency data 
released with a minor lag, reliance on this information content-wise deficient data source 
would lead to misleading inference. Taking these limitations into account, we made an 
attempt to form a database, which would entail expenditure and revenue figures consistent 
with the financing of the public fiscal accounts. Tables A1-A4 present annual fiscal accounts 
data in stock and flow forms expressed in terms of million USD.
11  We caveat, however, that 
the stock of duty losses of the state banks, which have been proclaimed as 1/6 of the total debt 
stock of the public sector in April 2001, is not included in these figures since information 
regarding the evolution of the duty loss stock is unavailable. 
Next, we touch upon the issue of calculating the market value of discounted debt using 
government debt data measured at par. We first get an estimate of the market value of the debt 
by dividing the face value each period’s debt stock by one plus the yield on government debt. 
Yield on government debt is difficult to obtain due to its heterogeneity with respect to 
maturity. We follow the common practice in the literature and obtain an approximate value 
for the yield on government debt by dividing total interest payments in this period by the face 
value of last period’s stock of outstanding public debt (using TL values of Table A4). 
Calculation of the discount rate entails the nominal GNP growth rate as well as the weighted 
average interest rate on 12-month deposits.
12 Finally, the discounted market value of the debt 
to GNP ratio is calculated using the formula given at endnote 9. For expository purposes, the 
face value, market value and the discounted value of the public debt to GNP ratio are 
displayed in Figure 1. Two things are apparent from Figure 1. First, the market value of the 
debt is less than the face value. Second, the discounted market value of debt lies sometimes 
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11 Even though the data given in the tables are quoted in million USD, the data used in the empirical part is in 
terms of TL. The average TL/USD exchange rate is used for the conversions.  
12 Ideally, we would have liked to use the yield on government securities, had they been available. The implied 
yield obtained for the purpose of calculating the market value of public debt generated negative discount rates 
after adjusting for nominal output growth. Hence the 12-month deposit rates are used.  Data on wholesale price index, gross national product, and reserve money stock, and 
annual weighted average of 12-month saving deposit interest rates are obtained from the web 
site of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey and the International Financial Statistics, 
published by the IMF. 
3.2 Empirical Results 
In this section we present the results of Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root tests as well as 
the Phillips-Perron unit root tests for the variables defined in the analytical section. For the 
purposes of fiscal policy sustainability in Turkey, a necessary and sufficient condition is that 
the market value of the discounted debt to GNP ratio be stationary. Our findings indicate that 
each of the three definitions of the debt to GNP ratio is nonstationary and integrated of order 
1, implying that the current fiscal policy is unsustainable. The results obtained from the unit 
root tests are in line with the visual conjecture provided by Figure 1 that the debt to GNP ratio 
has a nonzero mean, and that the process seems to be non-mean reverting. At this point a 
caveat is in order; stationarity test results may be interpreted as indicators of sustainability and 
not of solvency. A reduction in the discounted deficit GNP ratio due to either primary 
surpluses or the monetazition of the deficit may change the current unsustainable outlook. 
 
Table 1: Testing the Order of Integration 
    Constant  Trend  # of lags  ADF Test  PP Test 
Level  Yes  No  0  -0.36  -0.49  f
t b  
Difference  Yes   No  0  -4.85*
  -4.85* 
Level  Yes  No  0  -1.32  -1.09 
t b  
Difference  Yes  No  0  -3.87*  -3.87* 
Level  Yes  No  0  -1.16  -1.25 
t X  
Difference  Yes  No  0  -4.32*  -4.26* 
Level  Yes  Yes  1  -3.26  -3.76 
t p  
Difference  Yes  No  0  .6.06*  -6.44* 
Level  Yes  Yes  0  -4.27*  -4.39*  CD  Difference  -  -  -  -  - 
Level  Yes  No  0  -2.84  -2.80  PSBR  Difference  Yes  No  0  -5.66*  .6.29* 
Level  Yes  No  0  -5.63*  -5.69* 
Q h  
Difference  -  -  -  -  - 
Data definitions: 
f
t b :  face value of the public debt-GNP ratio;  t b : market value of the public debt-
GNP ratio;  t X : discounted market value of the public debt-GNP ratio;  t p : wholesale price inflation; 
CD: scaled consolidated deficit; PSBR: Scaled public sector borrowing requirement;  Q h  is the real 
output growth divided by one plus the real output growth. 
 * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at 5% level of significance 
 
Next, we investigate the existence of a stable long-run relationship between the inflation 
rate, scaled deficit and real growth rate. Stationarity test results indicate that even though the 
inflation rate and the scaled PSBR series are integrated of order 1, implying the existence of 
long-run components, the scaled consolidated budget deficit and the real output growth 
related variable are not. In other words, the scaled consolidated budget deficit process does 
not have a long-run component and hence cannot be related to the inflation rate process. This 
result confirms our aforementioned proposition that the consolidated budget deficit, even 
though easily available, is not a good indicator of public account balance.  
We next test for the existence of a stable relationship between the inflation rate and scaled 
PSBR, by checking to see if the two variables are cointegrated. In other words, whether short-run deviations from their long-term relation are temporary or not is formally tested. 
Likelihood ratio test statistics indicate the existence of a single cointegrating vector when a 
Vector Error Correction mechanism of order 2 with a constant in the cointegrating equation is 
estimated. Moreover, the error correction mechanism is validated for the inflation equation 
but not the scaled deficit equation, implying that the cointegrating vector be normalized for 
inflation. 
The estimated cointegrating vector is given below. 
[ ] [ ] 39 . 2 45 . 2
134 . 1 36 . 0 t t PSBR + = p
)
 
The cointegrating vector suggests that a 1 percent increase in the scaled PSBR increase the 
long-run value of the inflation rate by 1.13%. The t-statistics obtained from the asymptotic 
standard errors are given in brackets.  
For short-run dynamics, the estimated vector error correction mechanism is below. 
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] 28 . 3 84 . 1 0 . 2
72 . 0 36 . 1 73 . 0
60 . 0 57 . 0 87 . 0
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The error correction equation and the t-values given in brackets imply that the error 
correcting term is negative and significant, (validating the error correction mechanism) and 
the magnitude of 0.72 implies a rather fast convergence to equilibrium. On the other hand, the 
term involving the real output growth is increasing in the real growth rate and as expected, 
ceteris paribus an increase in the real output growth reduces the inflation rate. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we have looked at the conditions from which we could be drawing inferences 
regarding sustainability of fiscal stance on the one hand and a long-run relationship between 
inflation and budget deficits on the other. These issues have assumed even greater importance 
in the aftermath of the collapse of the stabilization program that had been designed to achieve 
sustainability in debt dynamics and produce a permanent reduction in inflation rates. The 
latter of these two goals would conceivably be achieved by dislodging the inertial component 
in the inflationary process, which was strictly conditional on success on the former goal.  
Our first set of empirical findings indicates that the discounted debt to GNP ratio process 
during 1970-2000 is inherently nonstationary, implying an unsustainable fiscal outlook. Our 
findings do not point to insolvency at this point in time, but point to the necessity of a policy 
change towards fiscal austerity if insolvency is to be avoided in the medium to long term. 
The second set of findings pertaining to the long-run relationship between the inflation 
rate, budget deficit, and real output growth suggests two important results. The first of these is 
that the consolidated budget deficit does not have a long-run component unlike the inflation 
rate, suggesting that changes in the consolidated budget deficit have no permanent effect on 
the inflation rate. On the other hand, the PSBR does have a long-run component and is 
cointegrated with the inflation rate. In non-technical terms, changes in the PSBR lead to permanent effects on the inflation rate. Hence, the PSBR should be deemed a better indicator 
of fiscal deficits in comparison to the consolidated budget deficit.  
Lack of accountability and transparency regarding that portion of the PSBR in excess of 
the consolidated budget deficit has been frequently referred to as endangering the medium to 
long-term fiscal sustainability. However, supportive empirical work has been lacking, and our 
intention was to contribute to the filling of this gap. 
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 DATA APPENDIX 
Table A1: Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 







Deficit  PSBR 
Interest 
Payments  GNP 
1970  -14.2  - -  - 13,994.3
1971  453.0  - -  - 18,648.0
1972  25.9  - -  - 22,438.5
1973  158.3  - -  - 28,506.3
1974  282.2  - -  - 38,821.5
1975  365.4  330.4 2,235.3  234 47,169.8
1976  639.0  633.6 3,605.5  240 53,468.8
1977  2,621.7  2,570.5 4,988.4  288 61,137.5
1978  1,017.6  1,121.4 2,159.8  305 66,456.8
1979  2,768.8  2,843.3 6,324.1  545 88,023.1
1980  2,230.7  2,786.1 6,242.1  423 71,180.6
1981  1,029.1  1,055.0 2,657.0  627 66,817.6
1982  955.7  1,020.2 2,273.0  531 64,485.3
1983  1,369.2  1,686.5 3,016.6  926 61,033.7
1984  2,651.2  2,094.4 3,235.3  1,195 60,049.0
1985  1,521.9  757.0 2,414.5  1,287 67,390.1
1986  2,070.2  805.8 2,741.7  1,952 75,072.6
1987  3,025.7  2,428.8 5,295.3  2,630 87,057.3
1988  2,776.1  2,386.4 4,338.1  3,463 89,870.7
1989  3,608.8  3,698.5 5,777.3  3,885 108,355.5
1990  4,577.7  5,480.4 11,268.8  5,348 152,087.1
1991  8,011.2 10,642.8 15,409.7  5,754 151,636.7
1992  6,886.3 11,667.5 16,939.3  5,850 160,217.6
1993  12,105.3 17,261.0 21,685.6  10,533 180,627.7
1994  5,098.5  8,445.0 10,283.3  9,993 130,256.6
1995  6,890.3  9,216.5 8,884.6  12,537 170,936.7
1996  15,136.9 17,338.4 16,391.6  18,307 183,116.0
1997  14,663.5 15,359.7 15,196.3  14,993 192,358.1
1998  14,203.3 15,725.6 20,607.2  23,547 204,031.5
1999  21,489.6 23,847.1 26,503.9  25,396 185,341.8
2000  18,433.5 17,408.4 30,552.4  32,614 201,002.4
Data Sources: The State Planning Organization’s Economic and Social Indicators, 
Turkish Audit Courts’ “Fiscal Report 2000”.  Ministry of Finance and authors’ own 
calculations.  
Consolidated budget consists of the general budget and the annexed institutions. 
Central Government consists of the balances of the consolidated budget, local 
authorities, Revolving Funds, Social Security Institutions as well as the Extra-
budgetary Funds and State Economic Enterprises under privatisation.  
The Public Sector Borrowing Requirement includes the balances of Central 
Government as well as the State Economic Enterprises. 
  
Table A2: Domestic Public Debt (million USD) 
















  A  B  A-B  C  B+C  A-(B+C)   
1970    155    38  193    1,241 
1971  679  285  394  41  326  353  353 1,710 
1972  808  617  191  82  699  109  462 1,902 
1973  123  268  -145  100  368  -244  218 1,757 
1974  420  170  250  116  286  134  354 2,026 
1975  1,654  410  1,243  164  575  1,079  1,414 3,159 
1976  1,782  513  1,269  161  675  1,107  2,383 4,119 
1977  2,463  888  1,575  193  1,081  1,382  3,516 5,263 
1978  3,179  963  2,216  202  1,165  2,014  4,587 6,068 
1979  3,307  562  2,745  389  951  2,356  5,832 7,344 
1980  1,477  367  1,110  297  665  812  3,370 4,331 
1981  4,344  1,346  2,998  342  1,688  2,656  4,747 5,685 
1982  2,744  1,383  1,362  208  1,590  1,154  4,617 5,509 
1983  1,677  585  1,092  350  935  742  4,071 5,063 
1984  7,486  2,562  4,923  478  3,040  4,445  6,963 8,055 
1985  4,626  2,208  2,418  471  2,680  1,947  6,847 8,086 
1986  7,807  2,799  5,008  951  3,751  4,057  9,324 11,229 
1987  10,993  6,155  4,838  1,460  7,615  3,378  10,755 13,723 
1988  14,377  4,250  10,127  2,197  6,448  7,930  14,378 18,354 
1989  10,674  4,534  6,139  2,400  6,934  3,740  13,460 18,548 
1990  11,432  5,734  5,698  3,682  9,416  2,016  12,974 20,798 
1991  13,819  7,667  6,152  4,046  11,713  2,107  10,205 19,135 
1992  21,999  11,728  10,271  4,430  16,158  5,841  12,039 21,892 
1993  31,597  19,358  12,239  8,308  27,666  3,931  11,430 25,876 
1994  28,164  19,613  8,551  7,780  27,393  771  5,005 18,137 
1995  39,394  25,729  13,665  10,276  36,006  3,389  6,640 25,446 
1996  68,088  48,764  19,324  16,208  64,973  3,115  6,845 33,619 
1997  41,519  21,128  20,391  14,854  35,982  5,537  9,201 38,387 
1998  55,765  33,855  21,910  21,440  55,295  470  5,831 44,273 
1999  63,689  36,904  26,785  23,438  60,342  3,347  6,970 54,293 
2000  51,808  30,266  21,542  29,690  59,956  -8,148  -3,453 58,114 
Data Sources: Turkish Audit Courts’ “Year 2000 Fiscal Report”, the Treasury and authors’ own calculations. 
The debt stock includes outstanding stock of government bonds and treasury bills.  
Short-term advances to the Treasury by the Central Bank and the duty losses of the state banks are excluded. 
  
TableA3: External Public Debt (million USD) 
















  A  B A-B C  B+C A-(B+C)     
1970  -  - - -  - -  - 1,844 
1971  401  109 292 53  162 239  239 2,224 
1972  337  157 180 63  220 117  356 2,454 
1973  415  126 289 80  206 209  565 2,866 
1974  326  147 179 92  239 87  652 3,136 
1975  293  156 137 106  262 31  683 3,182 
1976  583  165 418 145  310 273  956 3,619 
1977  849  196 653 168  364 485  1,441 4,438 
1978  1,259  289 970 176  465 794  2,235 6,464 
1979  4,410  445 3,965 266  711 3,699  5,934  11,030 
1980  2,400  564 1,836 486  1,050 1,350  7,284  15,007 
1981  1,887  768 1,119 960  1,728 159  7,443  15,241 
1982  2,050  1,154 896 1,137  2,291 -241  7,202  16,066 
1983  1,577  1,114 463 1,194  2,308 -731  6,471  16,042 
1984  2,435  1,125 1,310 1,138  2,263 172  6,643  16,541 
1985  2,745  2,229 516 1,295  3,524 -779  5,864  19,539 
1986  3,553  1,916 1,637 1,461  3,377 176  6,040  24,291 
1987  4,324  2,772 1,552 1,851  4,623 -299  5,741  31,541 
1988  7,199  3,762 3,437 2,386  6,148 1,051  6,792  33,563 
1989  4,465  3,503 962 2,593  6,096 -1,631  5,161  34,859 
1990  4,634  3,664 970 2,816  6,480 -1,846  3,315  38,684 
1991  5,307  4,242 1,065 2,735  6,977 -1,670  1,645  39,703 
1992  6,214  4,600 1,614 2,865  7,465 -1,251  394  40,360 
1993  7,069  3,987 3,082 3,004  6,991 78  472  44,259 
1994  4,122  4,727 -605 2,882  7,609 -3,487  -3,015  48,519 
1995  4,487  6,063-1,576 2,916  8,979 -4,492  -7,507  49,958 
1996  7,394  4,770 2,624 2,775  7,545 -151  -7,658  52,582 
1997  3,301  4,724-1,423 2,768  7,492 -4,191  -11,849  51,159 
1998  8,761  6,451 2,310 2,661  9,112 -351  -12,201  53,469 
1999  7,781  6,800 981 2,880  9,680 -1,899  -14,100  54,450 
2000  16,276  8,510 7,766 3,428 11,938 4,338  -9,762  62,216 
Data Sources: Turkish Audit Courts’ “Year 2000 Fiscal Report”, and the Treasury. 
  
Table A4: Total Public Debt (million USD) 
















  A  B  A-B C B+C A-(B+C)     
1970  -  -  - - - -  -  3,085 
1971  1,080  394  686 94 488 592  592  3,934 
1972  1,145  774  371 145 919 226  818  4,356 
1973  538  394  144 180 574 -35  783  4,623 
1974  746  317  429 208 525 221  1,006  5,162 
1975  1,947  566  1,380 270 837 1,110  2,097  6,341 
1976  2,365  678  1,687 306 985 1,380  3,339  7,738 
1977  3,312  1,084  2,228 361 1,445 1,867  4,957  9,701 
1978  4,438  1,252  3,186 378 1,630 2,808  6,822  12,532 
1979  7,717  1,007  6,710 655 1,662 6,055  11,766  18,374 
1980  3,877  931  2,946 783 1,715 2,162  10,654  19,338 
1981  6,231  2,114  4,117 1,302 3,416 2,815  12,190  20,926 
1982  4,794  2,537  2,258 1,345 3,881 913  11,819  21,575 
1983  3,254  1,699  1,555 1,544 3,243 11  10,542  21,105 
1984  9,921  3,687  6,233 1,616 5,303 4,617  13,606  24,596 
1985  7,371  4,437  2,934 1,766 6,204 1,168  12,711  27,625 
1986  11,360  4,715  6,645 2,412 7,128 4,233  15,364  35,520 
1987  15,317  8,927  6,390 3,311 12,238 3,079  16,496  45,264 
1988  21,576  8,012  13,564 4,583 12,596 8,981  21,170  51,917 
1989  15,139  8,037  7,101 4,993 13,030 2,109  18,621  53,407 
1990  16,066  9,398  6,668 6,498 15,896 170  16,289  59,482 
1991  19,126  11,909  7,217 6,781 18,690 437  11,850  58,838 
1992  28,213  16,328  11,885 7,295 23,623 4,590  12,433  62,252 
1993  38,666  23,345  15,321 11,312 34,657 4,009  11,902  70,135 
1994  32,286  24,340  7,946 10,662 35,002 -2,716  1,990  66,656 
1995  43,881  31,792  12,089 13,192 44,985 -1,103  -867  75,404 
1996  75,482  53,534  21,948 18,984 72,518 2,964  -813  86,201 
1997  44,820  25,852  18,968 17,622 43,474 1,346  -2,648  89,546 
1998  64,526  40,306  24,220 24,101 64,407 119  -6,370  97,742 
1999  71,470  43,704  27,766 26,318 70,022 1,447  -7,131  108,743 
2000  68,084  38,776  29,308 33,118 71,894 -3,810  -13,215  120,330 
Data Sources: Turkish Audit Courts’ “Year 2000 Fiscal Report”, the Treasury and authors’ own calculations. 
The total debt stock of the public does not include the duty losses of the state banks as well as the short- 
term advances to the Treasury. 
 
 